Tetra’s containment design combines registered wallet authority, local verification, and predefined endpoint enforcement.
This page describes design requirements. It is not an audit report.
The registered wallet authorizes containment and release through signed messages.
Only the public address is stored for authority matching. Private signing keys remain with the wallet.
No centralized override is included in the containment model.
Requests are verified locally for authenticity, authority, device binding, nonce validity, and time validity.
A valid signature is one part of the verification process. It does not replace the remaining checks.
The containment agent executes only supported, predefined actions.
The model excludes arbitrary command execution, remote shells, and surveillance capabilities.
Release requires a new valid wallet-signed request.
Expiration determines whether a request can be accepted. It does not automatically return a contained endpoint to Normal.
The design calls for local append-only records covering authorization attempts, verification outcomes, containment actions, release requests, and device-state transitions.
Implementation and tamper-resistance properties must be evaluated before stronger guarantees are stated.
The model assumes that the wallet’s private keys remain secure and the local endpoint agent retains its integrity.
Wallet authorization cannot compensate for compromised signing keys or a compromised enforcement component.
Containment applies only to supported device actions.
It cannot reverse completed blockchain transactions or retrieve information already disclosed.
Recovery procedures, platform compatibility, and behavior under failure conditions require implementation-specific documentation.
The current website presents the proposed architecture and illustrative workflows.
It does not establish independent audit completion, regulatory certification, production availability, or compatibility with a specific operating system.
